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CRIMINAL COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
I. Trotter Hardy*
INTRODUCTION
Copyright law prevents the unauthorized use of copyrighted works in two ways.
First, the law affords a civil remedy, including injunctions and damages, to
copyright owners whose works have been infringed. Second, the law also defines
certain violations of a copyright owner's rights to be criminal wrongs that can be
prosecuted by the United States. To date, the bulk of the copyright case law has
remained heavily a matter of civil law, with private party copyright owners as
plaintiffs. Recent trends in the law, including increased criminal penalties and the
addition of newly defined criminal wrongs relating to copyrighted materials suggest,
however, that criminal prosecutions are likely to grow substantially in relation to the
number of civil cases. Much of the recent trend toward increased penalties and
punishment has centered on infringements of electronic ("digital") materials,
especially as they are transmitted over the Internet where the opportunities for
infringement without detection are greatest today. Is copyright infringement
becoming a new "white-collar crime?"
Part I of this Article questions whether "copyright infringement" appropriately
falls within the category of "white-collar crime." In the past, it has not. For that
matter, past copyright cases have been dominated by private actions brought by
private party copyright owners in civil cases. But whether categorized as "white-
collar crime" or not, criminal copyright infringement likely will increase sharply in
the future. A very simple economic analysis of "punishment" as deterrence helps
to provide a theoretical underpinning for that prediction.
Part II offers evidence that criminal enforcement of copyrights is already
increasing. This Part traces the history of criminal copyright laws, showing that
"criminal copyright infringement" has been a part of our jurisprudence for over a
century, but that amendments to the Copyright Act in the past few years have
substantially added to this once-narrow provision.' These amendments have: (1)
increased the criminal penalties for infringement; (2) reclassified some
infringements from misdemeanor to felony status; and (3) created entirely new
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Technology, College of William & Mary
School of Law. The author states right away that he is much more of a copyright scholar than
a criminal law scholar and consequently apologizes if any of his discussion of criminal law
matters is ill-informed or inaccurate. He apologizes even more, of course, if the same is true
of his copyright law discussions; it's just that he expects more of the former than the latter.
See infra notes 41--48 and accompanying text.
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categories of criminal copyright wrongs.2
Unfortunately, any increase in the application of more serious penalties to
copyright infringement - whether civil or criminal - are likely to be accompanied
by increasing controversy. Part II argues that copyright law - at least as applied
to electronic materials and the Internet - more and more "strikes a raw nerve" in
the public. Indeed, today we see increasingly serious arguments in both the popular
press and the scholarly literature that copyright infringement proceedings are either
a bad idea in and of themselves, or should be defeated as restricting free speech or
other paramount rights, or at least that such proceedings should be sharply reduced
in scope and number because they are repugnant to freedom and liberty. Most of
this body of criticism also focuses on electronic ("digital") materials, especially as
they are transmitted over the Internet.
Part IV offers a theory to explain the ferment in public attitudes. One part of
this theory rests on the observation that punishment of some types of infringement
coincides with public attitudes. When infringers exhibit "sneaky behavior" in
attempting to profit financially, and also cause harm to the value of the copyright
owner's copyrights, they offend both tort-like and property-like concepts; the public
expects the activity to be punished. Other infringements, however, including many
involving digital works and the Internet, exhibit the same scope of harm to the value
of copyrights, but do not exhibit the same type of bad behavior and profit motive by
the infringer. The public's acceptance of punishment for these activities depends
on its acceptance of a "pure" property-like view of infringements. The second part
of the theory goes on to explore reasons that the public might not, in fact, have a
strong "property-like" view of intellectual property.
I. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AS "WHITE-COLLAR CRIME"
Is criminal copyright infringement appropriately classified as a "white-collar
crime?" Early definitions of the term from fifty years ago emphasized the status of
the perpetrator: "a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social
status in the course of his occupation."3 Copyright infringement can certainly be
accomplished by respectable people, although we ordinarily would not associate
infringement with a particular social status or occupation. Current thinking,
however, has changed the meaning of "white-collar crime". Although not
converging on a well-accepted alternative definition, contemporary views generally
shift the emphasis away from the status of the wrong-doer. One view, for example,
2 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2000); see supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
3 EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 9 (1949).
' Except, perhaps, for the occupation of "college student" and its association with the
action of copying MP3 music files.
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emphasizes the resources available for use in the commission of a crime.5 Not that
the presence of resources, such as accounting records and the corporate treasury in
an embezzlement scheme, should be taken to define "white-collar crime," but rather
that the amount of resources that the defendant controls should be understood to
correlate closely with the seriousness and scope of white-collar offenses.6 If "white-
collar crime" therefore means a crime committed by someone using sophisticated
resources that are readily available, typically at the place of employment, then
copyright infringement seems more easily to fall into that paradigm. Computers and
Internet access are, after all, sophisticated resources that often are available in the
workplace and these days are quite frequently involved in infringing activity.
Alternatively, other commentators emphasize the scope of the harm done by
white-collar criminals, coupled with the absence of physical violence and a
corresponding reliance on fraud or deceit as defining characteristics.' The "fraud
and deceit" elements, in fact, may be the common thread in modem analysis, as they
frequently appear in both the scholarly literature and in law enforcement. The
Department of Justice, for example, defines white-collar crime by listing several
elements, including deceit.' The Department's definition also refers to the status of
the defendant and the defendant's special skills or training, but as one thoughtful
commentator has noted, many wrongful acts like mail fraud are thought of as
"white-collar" crimes, even though they do not involve a special skill or status of the
defendant.9 The same commentator also has shown that the United States Chamber
of Commerce, for instance, identifies "deceit" as the salient characteristic of such
crimes.'0
' BookNote, White-Collar Criminals Unmasked, 105 HARV. L. REV. 2098,2099 (1992)
(citing DAVID WEISBURD ET AL., CRIMES OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES: WHITE-COLLAR
OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 60, 85-86 (1991)).
6 See Book Note, supra note 5, at 2099 (citing WEISBURD ET AL, supra note 5, at 80).
7 See AUGUST BEQUAI, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: A 20TH CENTURY CRISIS 3 (1978).
8 Here is the precise wording of the Department's definition:
Nonviolent crime for financial gain committed by means of deception by
persons whose occupational status is entrepreneurial, professional or semi-
professional and utilizing their special occupational skills and opportunities;
also, nonviolent crime for financial gain utilizing deception and committed by
anyone having special technical and professional knowledge of business and
government, irrespective of the person's occupation.
J. Kelly Strader, The Judicial Politics Of White Collar Crime, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1199,
1207-08 (1999) (quoting BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEP'TOF JUSTICE,
DICTIONARY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA TERMINOLOGY 215 (2d ed. 1981)).
9 Strader, supra note 8, at 1208.
10 Id. The Chamber's definition includes "illegal acts characterized by guile, deceit, and
concealment - and are not dependent upon the application of physical force or violence or
threats thereof." Id. (quoting CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, WHITE
COLLAR CRIME 3 (1974)). Strader does not, incidentally, agree that "deceit" is the
appropriate hallmark of white-collar crime, reasoning that the Chamber's "definition also
2002]
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Copyright infringement activities will rarely include physical harm or violence.
To that extent, infringement coincides with that often-mentioned white-collar
characteristic. The typical infringer does not use a blackjack, after all, but rather
uses technology like computers, photocopiers, web sites, or CD duplicators - just
as is true with white-collar defendants who use computer spread sheets for
embezzlement, or e-mail to commit wire fraud.
Infringements may have either a broad or narrow scope of harm, however,
causing anything from huge volumes of lost sales (as plaintiffs at least claimed in
the Napster case") and quite substantial and objectively verifiable losses,12 to
essentially no harm at all (as when a teacher copies a current newspaper article for
a class handout).'3 In light of some commentators' emphasis on the large scale of
harm that white-collar crimes imply, infringement seems not to fit the mold so well.
But we could separately categorize infringements as having either "big" or "small"
harms, thinking of the first as associated with "white-collar crime," but not the
second. Many widely accepted "white-collar" wrongs could presumably involve
only negligible harm, after all, but commentators would still think of the general
category of the wrong as being "white-collar crime." Strengthening that argument
in the copyright context is the fact that criminal copyright infringement typically
will entail a large scope of harm, not so much because of the statutory definition of
the crime,' 4 but rather because the Department of Justice will not lightly mobilize
its army of legal talent to undertake criminal prosecution of small scale or "petty"
infringers.
Finally, copyright infringement seldom depends on fraud or deceit in the way
seems too narrow, for some quintessential white collar crimes do not necessarily involve
deception." Strader, supra note 8, at 1208. Nevertheless, my reading ofthe literature suggests
that fraud and deceit, especially as they imply the absence of physical violence, are the best
candidates for a "least common denominator" definition.
" SeeA&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2001).
12 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 567 (1985)
("Rarely will a case of copyright infringement present such clear-cut evidence of actual
damage.").
'" Copying a single newspaper article for a one-time classroom handout is a copyright
infringement by definition, but the negligible scope of any "harm" from that activity would
give the teacher a near iron-clad defense of "fair use." See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); see also
AGREEMENT ON GUIDELINES FOR CLASSROOM COPYING IN NOT-FOR-PROFIT EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68-70 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5681-83 (delineating the oft-called "Educational Fair Use Guidelines" that discuss
copies as class handouts).
14 The statute only requires proof that the defendant intended commercial advantage or
financial gain - with no particular dollar amount being specified - or proof that the
defendant reproduced or distributed more than $1,000 worth of unauthorized copies in a six-
month period. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000).
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that white-collar crimes do, such as by a reliance on consumer fraud or
embezzlement. One could imagine, of course, a defendant using deceit to obtain
some original work for the purpose of unauthorized copying.
However well or ill the wrong of "copyright infringement" might fit
theoretically under the heading ofwhite-collar crime, most writers on the subject do
not deal with copyright infringements. In fact, many studies of white-collar crime
never mention the subject at all, whereas they are likely to include a quite broad
array of other criminal activities, such as "securities law violations, antitrust
offenses, bribery, bank embezzlement, mail fraud, tax fraud, credit fraud, and false
claims to the government."' 5 Even those who urge a broader range of wrongs to be
considered as white-collar wrongs may hint at the inclusion of copyright
infringement, but typically fall short of expressly'declaring "infringement" to be a
white-collar crime. One commentator, for example, includes computer "hackers"
who erase medical records as white-collar criminals, as well as money launderers,
toxic waste dumpers, and sellers of fraudulent HIV-detection kits over the
Internet - but does not include "copyright infringers" in this same list.' 6 The
Cornell University Law School's Legal Information Institute (LII), an online
collection of a large array of primary and secondary legal information, likewise
includes as "white-collar crimes" a range of activities that come close to including
copyright infringement, but without quite doing so. Instead, the LII mentions these
wrongs: "antitrust violations, computer/internet fraud, credit card fraud,
phone/telemarketing fraud, bankruptcy fraud, healthcare fraud, environmental law
violations, insurance fraud, mail fraud, government fraud, tax evasion, financial
fraud, securities fraud, insider trading, bribery, kickbacks, counterfeiting, public
corruption, money laundering, embezzlement, economic espionage, and trade secret
theft .. .
One would be hard pressed to say, in sum, that commentators, observers,
scholars, or anybody else actually thinks of criminal copyright infringement as a
type of white-collar crime. As one last check on this conclusion, I recently walked
along our law school library's shelves where books on white-collar crime are
located. At random, I picked a dozen volumes with titles that included the words
"White Collar Crime" and looked through their indices for "copyright," "patent,"
and "intellectual property." Not a single one of the volumes included an entry for
any of these terms.
Readers may well say at this point: Of course copyright infringement is not
considered a white-collar crime; hardly ever is it a "crime" of any sort, as nearly all
's Book Note, supra note 5, at 2099 (citing WEISBURD ET AL., supra note 5, at 9-11).
6 See John B. Owens, Have We No Shame?: Thoughts on Shaming, "White Collar"
Criminals, and ihe Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1047,1051-52(2000).
'7 LEGAL INFO. INST., CORNELL LAW SCH., WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: AN OVERVIEW, at
http:// www.law.comell.edu/topics/whitecollar.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2003).
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cases are civil cases. And historically, that has been true: When people, whether
lawyers or not, speak of "copyright" or "copyright law," they almost invariably
think of civil copyright law.'" One confirmation of this view of copyright as almost
entirely a matter of civil law comes from a review of textbooks in copyright law.
Most textbooks cover civil law casesfar more extensively than criminal law cases,
if they cover the latter at all. But we need not rest there: As a rough indicator of the
balance of civil cases to criminal cases, I conducted several searches on Lexis, in the
"Copyright Cases, Federal" library. The searches were designed to return cases in
two groups - those that were likely to be criminal cases, and those that were likely
to be non-criminal cases - by specifying the presence or absence of the term
"United States" as a named party. This technique obviously does not provide a
precise measure, as the "United States" can be a party or intervener in a civil suit.
But even with these obvious limitations, as long as most of the cases that involve the
United States as a party are criminal in nature (and my own informal review
suggests very strongly that they are), the results point unambiguously to the
conclusion that civil cases have always outnumbered criminal ones by a
considerable margin. 9
IS For example, Party A owns a copyright, and files a civil suit against Party B, who is
accused of unauthorized copying.
" I first conducted searches by trying to group the case s into decades, but the civil cases
(i.e., those without "United States" as a named party) consistently numbered over one
thousand, for which Lexis will neither produce any actual results, nor give a number other
than "more than one thousand." Therefore, I confined each search to a specific year, which
gave more detailed results.
Here is a summary of the results from the first search, organized by decade, in the
"Copyright Cases, Federal" library, on September 15, 2002:
Search terms' Result "
date < 1-1-1978 and name(united states) 421 cases
date < 1-1-1978 and not name(united states) More than 1000
d0ate > I -,1978'.nd date ' 1-1-1988 and'name(unlted states) 266 cases
date > 1-1-1978 and date < 1-1-1988 and not name(unlted states) More than 1000
date > 1-1-1988 and date < 1-1-1998 and name(united states) 401 cases
date > 1-1-1988 and date < 1-1-1998 and name(united states) More than 1000
date > 1-1-1998 and date < 1-1-1999 and name(united states) 407 cases
date >. 1-1-1 998 and date < 1-1-1999 and not namne(united states).- More than 1000
[Vol. 11:305
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There is good reason to think that this balance may shift in the future.2" (The
search results just mentioned offer some present evidence of that shift, though I do
not base my conclusions on that evidence.") Distinctions between criminal law and
The following chart illustrates the results from the more revealing second search,
conducted in the "Copyright Cases, Federal" library, on September 22, 2002:
Searcftermsi: Result ,
date = 1980 and name(united states) 22 cases
date = 1980 and not name(united states) 175 cases (8 times as many cases)
date =1985 and name(united states), 24 cases
date = 1985 and not name(united states) 274 cases (11 times as many cases)
date = 1990 and name(united states) 40 cases
date = 1990 and not name(united states) 429 cases (11 times as many cases)
date = 1995 and name(urnited states 39 cases
date 1995 and not name(united states) 561 cases (14 times as many cases)
date = 1996 and name(united states) 39 cases
date = 1996 and not name(united states) 563 cases (14 times as many cases)
date = 1997 and name(uhited states) 40 cases
date =,1997 and not name(united states) 483 cases (12 times as-many cases)
date = 1998 and name(united states) 407 cases (not sure why so high; perhaps
related to the enactment of the DMCA)
date = 1998 and not name(united states) More than 1000 bases (not sure why so high;
perhaps related to the enactment of the DMCA)
date =1999 and name(united states) 29cases
date =1999 and not name(united, states) .403'cases (14 times as many cases)
date = 2000 and name(united states) 26 cases
date = 2000 and not name(united states) 496 cases (19 times as many cases)
date = 2001 and name(united states) 182 cases
date =2001 and not name(united states)* 827 cases (5 times as many cases)
date = 2002 and name(united states) 207 cases
[as of 9-22-2002]
date = 2002 and not name(united states) 995 cases (5 times as many cases)
[as of 9-22-2002)
See also Michael Coblenz, Intellectual Property Crimes, 9 ALB. L.J. Scl. & TECH. 235,
241-42 (1999).
20 See P.N. GRABOSKY & RUSSELLG. SMITH, CRIME IN THE DIGITAL AGE: CONTROLLING
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND CYBERSPACE ILLEGALITIES 117 (1998) (writing principally from
the perspective of Australian law, the authors noted the "[likel.ihood] that the future will see
an expanded use of [criminal proceedings]").
"1 See supra note 19. The second table shows roughly twenty to forty cases likely to be
criminal in nature in each of the years searched between 1980 and 2000, except for the
unusual year of 1998, which presented ten times as many cited cases - 407. However, in
2001, we saw 182 cases, approximately six times more than what had been typical. Even
more intriguing is the fact that in only the first three quarters of 2002, the number of cases
likely to be criminal in nature has already exceeded two hundred. These numbers are
interesting and perhaps indicative of a trend. I note, however, that they are not the product
of any carefully controlled, statistically rigorous studies, nor are they used to support
anything else presented in this Article.
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civil law usually emphasize the greater magnitude or scope of the wrongdoing
addressed by the former over the latter. In particular, the justification for
wrongdoing to be a matter of the state's interest is that the activity is egregious
enough to affect or offend the entire community.22 But another reason also supports
the imposition of criminal penalties: Criminal conviction is typically a harsher
punishment than a civil penalty; as such, it has greater deterrence value23 and is
appropriate for activities that would otherwise be difficult to deter. Greater
deterrence of copyright infringements is appropriate when the infringements are
largely invisible to copyright owners and consequently difficult to detect.
Infringements of electronic materials, especially those infringements made possible
by the ubiquitous and decentralized Internet, very much fit this mold. For copyright
owners, at least, the situation almost cries out for greater deterrence and
consequently for more reliance on criminal punishments.
We can express the concepts of punishment and deterrence in terms of costs,
benefits, and probabilities: Potential wrongdoing defendants will, in general, be
deterred from wrongdoing if the contemplated wrong "costs" more than it is worth.
Suppose, for example, that the legal system ensured a one-hundred percent certainty
of immediate detection and conviction for robbery - robbers would be caught
promptly and punished, without exception. Suppose further that the penalty for
22 Blackstone defined the difference this way:
Wrongs are divisible into two sorts or species: private wrongs and public
wrongs. The former are an infringement or privation of the private or civil rights
belonging to individuals, considered as individuals, and are thereupon frequently
termed civil injuries: the latter are a breach and violation of public rights and
duties, which affect the whole community, considered as a community, and are
distinguished by the harsher appellation of crimes and misdemeanors.
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 2, cited in Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657,
668-69 (1892); see also Bowles v. Farmers Nat'l Bank, 147 F.2d 425, 428 (6th Cir. 1945)
("The basic test whether a law is penal in the strict and primary sense is whether the wrong
sought to be redressed is a wrong to the public or a wrong to the individual.").
23 See David Goldstone, Deciding Whether to Prosecute an Intellectual Property Case,
49 UNrrED STATES ATTORNEYS' BULL. No. 2, at 1, 3-4 (Mar. 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading_room/usab4902.pdf (last visited Jan. 20,
2003):
Criminal prosecution oflP crimes is also important for general deterrence. Many
individuals may commit intellectual property crimes not only because they can
be relatively easy to commit (such as copying music) but also because the
subjects believe they will not be prosecuted. Criminal prosecution plays an
important role in establishing public expectations of right and wrong. Even
relatively small scale violations, if permitted to take place openly and
notoriously, can lead other people to believe that such conduct is tolerated in
American society.... Vigorous prosecutions can change the counterfeiter's
calculus. If individuals believe that counterfeiters will be investigated and
prosecuted, they will be deterred.
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robbery was that the robber had to pay back one dollar for every dollar stolen - that
is, completely disgorge all ill-gotten gains. Under such a regime, would-be robbers
who knew that they had no chance at all of "getting away with it," would not likely
steal, say, $100. The result would not be worth the undertaking, given that the
robber would immediately be required to give back the $100 and, hence, end up -
especially after going through the trouble, time, and effort to engage in the robbery
- no better off financially than before.
Now suppose that detection and punishment are not certain. Instead, suppose
that the chance of "getting caught" is only fifty percent. In probability terms, the
would-be robber's potential benefit from a robbery is the robber's "expected value"
from the robbery. The "expected value" is the actual value, discounted by the
likelihood that the value will be obtained. Here, if the robber were to steal $100, the
expected benefit would be $50: the full value of $ 100, multiplied by the chance that
the benefit can be kept - that is, of not being caught - of fifty percent. The
resulting "expected value" of the robbery, the $50, is now greater than nothing.
Hence, the robber would find it much more worthwhile to undertake the robbery
than before.24
But now suppose that in this situation we were to increase the punishment. If
we doubled it, then for every dollar stolen, the robber would be forced to pay back
two dollars. Even if the chance of getting caught remained fifty percent, the
doubling of the punishment would bring the expected gain from the robbery back
down to zero: $100 gained from the robbery initially, minus a $200 pay-back
punishment, discounted by a fifty- percent likelihood of having to endure the
punishment. That is: $100- .50($200) = $100 - $100 = $0 gained. In other words,
if the chance of detecting and punishing a wrongdoer cannot be one-hundred
percent, then increasing the amount of the punishment can help to preserve any
given level of deterrence.
In many cases of copyright infringement today, the chance that an infringer will
be caught is substantially less than fifty percent. For many individuals using the
Internet, for example, the chance of being caught for occasionally downloading a
copyrighted song, or uploading a copyrighted piece of software, is almost zero. Yet
(or perhaps, "therefore") the frequency of copying of such materials seems to be
going up exponentially.25
24 This simple example omits consideration of much, such as the fact that some people
are more risk-averse than others and that some people may rob partly from a taste for
wrongdoing in and of itself. But the addition of these factors could be accommodated by
changing the numbers to reflect higher or lower expected gains. There would still be a set of
values for those numbers, once adjusted, that characterized deterrence from punishment as
I have described it. Consequently, taking account of such complexities would only make my
example harder to follow without changing any of the conclusions so I have not done that.
25 See David Goldstone & Michael O'Leary, Novel Criminal Copyright Infringement
Issues Related to the Internet, 49 UNITED STATES ATroRNEYS' BULL., No. 5, at 33 (May
2002]
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This tiny chance of punishment has led a number of commentators to argue that
copyright laws should be abandoned, at least for digital copying on the Internet if
not everywhere else. These individuals have contended that if the rules against
copying are unenforceable, then preserving those rules only reduces respect for the
law on the Internet, and perhaps even in other contexts. But these arguments
overlook the proposition just explained. if the likelihood of catching unauthorized
copying on the Internet is small - even very small - the deterrence of such activity
can nevertheless be brought up to almost any desired level by increasing the
punishment for those who do get caught.26
Applying criminal punishments - and perhaps labeling the activity as "white-
collar crime" - is one way to do that. We should not be surprised to find that the
last decade or so has brought generally heightened punishments - including a
greater range of activity subject to criminal prosecution - to copyright law.
Nowhere is this trend more visible than with the infringement of electronic
materials, by now the conventional example of an activity with a very low
likelihood of detection.
Unhappily, though, the trend toward greater deterrence through greater
punishment of infringement, especially criminal punishment, seems increasingly at
odds with the public's perception of what is fair and what is consistent with the
American tradition of individual liberty. As the Apple Computer corporation used
to advertise in regard to a device that copies music CDs: "Rip, mix, burn. After all,
it's your music."27
Part II of this Article argues that criminal penalties for copyright infringement
are indeed on the upswing. Although some sort of criminal sanctions have been a
part of copyright law for over a hundred years, the last few decades have seen a
marked increase in amendments that involve criminal penalties or that define new
criminal wrongs in the context of copyright infringement.
Part III attempts to explain some of the reasons that so many people are
receptive to the idea that "it's their music." The sense of ownership over whatever
is in hand leads many people to assume that they are able to do whatever they want
with "their music," including, of course, copying and further distributing it. In turn,
that sense of ownership helps to demonstrate why so many people are not receptive
2001), available athttp://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foiareadingroom/usab4903 .pdf(last
visited Jan. 20, 2003).
26 See generally TROTTER HARDY, PROJ ECT LOOKING FORWARD: SKETCHING THE FUTURE
OF COPYRIGHT IN A NETWORKED WORLD 265 & n.372 (1998) (citing RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 230 (1992) (describing two particularly harsh examples of
punishment: death by boiling in oil for poisoning during the Middle Ages, and the
nineteenth-century American practice of hanging those convicted of horse thievery), and
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968)), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/thardy.pdf(last visited Jan. 20,2003).
27 LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FuTURE OF IDEAS 9 (2001).
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to increased penalties for infringement.
1H. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT INCREASINGLY BEING CRIMINALIZED
Criminal punishments for copyright infringement have been with us for a long
time. Congress adopted the first criminal provision in 1897.2" Interestingly, the
1897 provision applied only to unauthorized performances of plays and music, not
to the reproduction of books or maps, which have the oldest pedigree in our
copyright law.29 The narrowness of the criminal provision likely sprang from a rise
in the late nineteenth century of a phenomenon not previously associated with
copyright infringement - what we might today call "hit and run" performing
groups. As described in later hearings before Congress, the owners of copyrighted
plays had complained about the futility of trying to enforce their copyright rights
when "the performances are usually given at points remote from the location or
headquarters of the dramatic author or producer, and by irresponsible persons, who
jump their companies nightly from town to town.""a  Given the difficulty of
detecting and punishing these very localized and very mobile infringements,
Congress acted in 1897 to increase the applicable penalties.3'
Congress broadened the range of infringements that qualified as criminal
violations in 1909, including within the criminally prohibited reach all types of
infringements, not just performances.32 But the requirements for conviction
included the defendant's undertaking of infringements that were "willful" and "for
profit," largely confining the application of the criminal provisions to fairly
extensive commercial activities. The statute at that time, Section 104(b), provided
that: "Any person who willfully and for profit shall infringe any copyright .... or
•.. knowingly and willfully aid or abet such infringement, shall be fined not more
28 See Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481 (appearing in the 1909 Copyright Act as
Section 104) ("[A]ny person who willfully and for profit shall infringe any copyright...
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor .... ).
29 The very first copyright statute was enacted in 1790 and applied to a short list of
copyrightable subject matter: "books, maps, and charts." Act ofMay 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat.
124. Music as such was not added until 1831. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 15, 4 Stat. 436. Note,
incidentally, that protection was available from the very first Copyright Act for "books."
Composers who sought protection for sheet music could therefore register their music as a
"book" before 1831. "Dramatic compositions" were not added explicitly until 1856. See Act
of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138.
30 Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Patents, 60th Cong.
24 (1908) (statement of Ligon Johnson, representing the National Association of Theatrical
Managers), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT, pt. K, at 24
(E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1976); see also H.R. REP. No. 91-53, at 2 (1894)
(making similar comments some years earlier).
3' See H.R. REP. No. 91-53, at 2 (1894); accord Coblenz, supra note 19, at 238-39.
32 See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
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than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both, for the first offense and
[be punished even more for later offenses]."33
A later rewording of the "for profit" language so that it read "for purposes of
commercial advantage or private financial gain" seems not to have entailed any
Congressional thought or expectation of substantive change, and has remained the
core of criminal infringement as defined in Section 506 of the current Act.34
Despite the early narrowness of the statutory definitions of criminal
infringement, however, judicial interpretations of the provision tended to be
generous toward the government. The requirement for proof of "profit," for
example, acquired a gloss that the defendant's activities need only be for "the
purpose" of profit. No actual profit need have been attained. This rule continues
today under Section 506"5 and is explicit: "Any person who infringes a copyright
willfully... for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain, [shall
be punished under the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 23 l9].36
In fact, if anything were to have changed under the current provisions of
Section 506 compared to prior wording, it would be a lessening of the burden on the
government (although the case law does not typically make much of that
possibility 7). Section 506 attenuated the express requirement of proving that the
defendant had the purpose of "profit," down to a less specific requirement of
proving that the defendant had the purpose of "commercial advantage or private
financial gain."
Moreover, the requirement of "purpose" has come to connote no more than a
rather low threshold: that the defendant had "the hope of some pecuniary gain."''
That gain need not even be something the defendant sought directly for herself. For
example, when an employee infringes for the purpose of her employer's advantage
or gain, the employee herself can be guilty of the violation. 9
13 Id. at § 104(b).
14 See United States v. Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046, 1050 (D. Neb. 1991) ("With the
exception of inserting the phrase 'for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial
gain' for the word 'profit,' a change thought not to be material.... the present statute [i.e.,
the 1976 Act, 17 U.S.C. Section 506] is nearly identical to the 1909 statute.") (citing
MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 15.01, at 15-1 n. 1).
" United.States v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 301 (7th Cir. 1987) ("A conviction under 17
U.S.C. § 506(a) does not require that a defendant actually realize either a commercial
advantage or private financial gain. It is only necessary that the activity be for the purpose
of financial gain or benefit.") (citing United States v. Moore,757 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1979)).
36 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
31 See, e.g., Moran, 757 F. Supp. at 1050-51; see also supra note 34.
31 See Moore, 604 F.2d at 1235 ("[T]he defendants argue that there was no proof that the
tape was distributed for profit... because the tape was not sold for money. Under § 104(b),
it is irrelevant whether there was an exchange for value so long as there existed the hope of
some pecuniary gain.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
11 See Cross, 816 F.2d at 301.
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Recent years have seen Congress resort more frequently to criminalization, or
to increased criminal penalties, for copyright infringement. In 1974, for instance,
Congress stiffened criminal penalties, though with the exception of repeat offenders,
criminal infringement remained classified as a misdemeanor.40 In 1982, Congress
for the first time defined certain infringements to be felonies and also - not
coincidentally- removed the specification of criminal penalties from the Copyright
Act, placing them in the criminal code.4' At the same time, Congress raised the
ceiling on monetary penalties from $10,000 to $250,000 - a twenty-five-fold
increase - for infringements of motion picture and sound recording copyrights. 2
In that same year, 1982, prison sentences for criminal infringement were limited
to two years, and the statute required a finding that the defendant had made more
than one hundred copies over a six-month period before punishment could be
imposed.43 Two years later, in 1984, Congress raised the maximum prison sentence
for large-scale infringement activities from two years to five years." Congress also
lessened the requirement for the imposition of monetary penalties by changing the
number of infringing copies necessary for that imposition from one hundred to only
"one or more sound recordings" or "more than seven but less than sixty-five copies
[of] one or more motion pictures."' 5
During the decade or so after 1984, computers and computer software exploded
in growth with the development and rapid adoption of desktop "personal
computers." That same decade saw comparable growth in consumer digital audio
equipment from the development of the "compact digital" or "CD" recording
format. Both developments, incidentally, in some ways paralleled the similar
explosion of home video and home analog music recording equipment - with
VCRs and cassette tape recorders - that had happened a decade earlier. 6 That
rapid growth, especially of computer software, caused Congress once again to turn
its attention to criminal copyright infringement. This time, the previously different
treatments of infringements according to the different types of copyrighted works
at issue were made consistent. 7 The maximum prison sentence for certain
40 See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1581 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6849, 6852.
41 Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-180, 96 Stat. 91
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2000)).
42 See Karen J. Bernstein, The No Electronic Theft Act: The Music Industry's New
Instrument In The Fight Against Internet Piracy, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 325, 328-29 &
nn. 15-18 (2000).
41 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1976).
4 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 3571 (2000)), reviewed in Bernstein, supra note 42, at 328-29 & nn.15-18.
41 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2000) (emphasis added).
46 United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 540 (D. Mass. 1994) ("[T]he home
computing and software industry underwent a period of explosive growth paralleling the
expansion in the 1960s and 1970s of the recording and motion picture industries.").
41 Copyright Felony Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-561, 106 Stat. 4233 (codified as
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infringements - excluding that of motion pictures and sound recordings that had
required proof that the defendant had made at least one hundred copies - was
increased to five years on a required showing of only ten copies (with a value of
more than $2,500).4"
By the mid-1990s, the "new breed" of copyright infringers, whom we might
characterize as falling between the "good" and "bad" ones, had clearly appeared on
the scene. University student Brian LaMacchia heralded their arrival. LaMacchia
started an online computer service with commonly available file uploading and
downloading facilities. Not so commonly, however, he encouraged his users to
upload commercial software packages for the privilege of being able to download
still other commercial software packages that other users had uploaded. He did not,
however, charge any fee or receive monetary compensation for this entirely
unauthorized service. The lack of any purpose of "commercial advantage or private
financial gain" meant that LaMacchia, although responsible for the production of
perhaps thousands of infringing copies of commercial software, could not be
charged with criminal copyright infringement.49
The government charged him instead with what must have looked to be the
closest applicable criminal offense - wire fraud. The trial court found that the
government could not establish the elements of that offense, however, and so the
trial court exonerated him. In reaching that conclusion, the court essentially invited
Congress to correct the problem of the inapplicability of criminal copyright
infringement statutes to activities like those undertaken by LaMacchia. 0
Congress accepted the court's suggestion for additional penalties applicable to
the type of conduct evidenced in the LaMacchia case by adopting the "No
Electronic Theft Act" (the "N.E.T." Act) in 1997."' Under the N.E.T. Act,
conviction is still possible for violations of the original provision - infringement
committed for the purpose of advantage or gain. But conviction is now also
possible, without a showing of such purpose, when a defendant commits an
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2000)).
48 Id.
41 See LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 545 (analyzing a case brought on charges of wire
fraud).
0 Criminal as well as civil penalties should probably attach to willful, multiple
infringements of copyrighted software even absent a commercial motive on the
part of the infringer. One can envision ways that the copyright law could be
modified to permit such prosecution. But, "[i]t is the legislature, not the Court,
which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment."
United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994) (quoting Dowling v. United
States, 473 U.S. 207, 214 (1985) (quoting United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)
76, 95 (1820))).
"' The No Electronic Theft (NET) Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678-80
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2000), 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2000), and 28 U.S.C.
§ 994 (2000)).
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infringement "by the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means,
during any 180-day period, of one or more copies or phonorecords of one or more
copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $ 1,000. "52 For the
first time, Congress had fundamentally changed the criminal copyright provisions
by adding a new section that did not focus at all on the defendant's gains, but rather
focused on the potential consequences of the defendant's actions on the plaintiff's
losses.53
The usual criminal requirement of some sort of mens rea was left in the statute
as a requirement that the defendant exhibit "willfulness" in regard to the
infringement. The concept of "willfulness" has proved troublesome for courts,
presenting the same sort of interpretative difficulty that an "intent" requirement
often can in other areas of the law,54 namely whether the requirement is "general"
or "specific." In the context of the N.E.T. Act, the question becomes whether the
willfulness must be in regard to the legal consequences of one's actions, or whether
it is enough that the willfulness is in regard to the facts of the matter. If it is the
former, the government must prove that a defendant like LaMacchia sought
intentionally to commit the legal offense of copyright infringement. If it is the latter,
then the government need only prove that the defendant sought to engage in the
reproductions or other activities at issue, regardless of her understanding that those
acts constituted infringement.
Courts have taken both approaches, though the majority seems to have adopted
the "specific intent" interpretation of the requirement." In a 1991 case, for example,
52 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (2000).
3 The statute does not directly deal with "plaintiffs losses;" rather, it speaks in terms of
the "retail value" of the infringing works. That value is not the same thing as the plaintiffs
lost sales, for not every unauthorized sale would have been an authorized one had the
unauthorized sales been prevented ahead of time. Generally speaking, the lower the price of
the unauthorized copies, the less likely that their buyers would have bought the higher priced
authorized copies. But even so, after LaMacchia, Congress clearly wanted to deter copying
without regard to the defendant's "profits" or "gains." In so doing, Congress necessarily
shifted its focus to the plaintiffs losses, however crudely measured they might be by the
"retail value" metric. Otherwise - if neither defendants' gains nor plaintiffs' losses were
relevant - very little "harm" would be left to justify the statute in the first place.
5' Tort cases often exhibit this same question. For example, is it enough to constitute the
tort of battery if the defendant intended to do what she did - that is, that the defendant's
conduct was voluntary? Or must the plaintiff prove that the defendant intended to cause the
specific harm that ensued? Compare Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403 (Wisc. 1891) (finding
a boy who kicked a schoolmate under a table liable for other boy's subsequent leg
amputation, even though he had no intent at all to cause that outcome), with Spivey v.
Battaglia, 258 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1972) (holding a worker who playfully put his arm around
co-worker's neck to be not liable for the co-worker's resulting neck fracture on the grounds
that the defendant worker had not intended that outcome).
" See generally Mary Jane Saunders, Criminal Copyright Infringement And The
Copyright Felony Act, 71 DENv. U. L. REv. 671, 688 (1994) (footnotes omitted):
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an appealing defendant (a police officer with a reputation for honesty who also ran
a video tape rental business) was found not guilty of criminal copyright
infringement because he lacked the necessary "willfulness." 6 The court concluded
that:
"[W]illfully" means that in order to be criminal the infringement must
have been a "voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty." I
am so persuaded because I believe that in using the word "willful"
Congress intended to soften the impact of the common-law presumption
that ignorance of the law or mistake of the law is no defense to a criminal
prosecution by making specific intent to violate the law an element of
federal criminal copyright offenses."
Congress added a number of amendments to the Copyright Act in 1998 under
the umbrella title of the "Digital Millennium Copyright Act" ("DMCA")."8 Among
other changes, the DMCA defined three new areas of criminal wrongdoing. One
amendment prohibits the act of bypassing a technology used to limit access to
copyrighted works.5 9 A second prohibits trafficking in devices that are used for that
same purpose,6" and the third prohibits trafficking in devices used to bypass a
In the context of criminal copyright infringement, courts have interpreted
the term "willfully" in two ways. The majority of courts have said that the
language of the Copyright Act makes criminal copyright infringement a
"specific" intent crime; in other words, a prosecutor must show that the accused
specifically intended to violate the copyright law.
The minority view, endorsed by the Second and Ninth Circuits, holds that
in the context of a criminal copyright infringement proceeding, "willful" means
only intent to copy, not intent to infringe. For example, the Second Circuit found
liability where the defendant, although without actual notice from the copyright
owner, unlawfully issued instructions to make copies resembling the copyrighted
work "as closely as they might without 'copyright trouble,"' indicating the
defendant was aware of the legal prohibition against infringement.
56 United States v. Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Neb. 1991).
57 Id. at 1049 (citations omitted).
51 105 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
" See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000) ("No person shall circumvent a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.").
60 See id. § 1201(a)(2):
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise
traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof,
that -
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected
under this title;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to
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technology that protects a copyright owner's normal copyright rights.6
The first two provisions may appear to be similar to the third, but they are
designed for different circumstances. The normal rules of copyright law give the
copyright owner the exclusive right to permit or deny reproduction, distribution,
performances, displays, and the preparation of other works based on or derived from
the copyrighted work.62 When a defendant bypasses a technology that is used, for
example, to limit unauthorized copying, the third DMCA provision comes into play.
Many modem-day technologies, however, involve collections of information that
circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a
work protected under this title; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person
with that person's knowledge for use in circumventing a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.
61 Id. § 1201(b)(1):
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise
traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof,
that-
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing
protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a
right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof,
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to
circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively
protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion
thereof; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person
with that person's knowledge for use in circumventing protection afforded
by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright
owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof.
62 The text gives only a simplified characterization of the actual rights as they are defined
in the Copyright Act. The full language defining copyright rights appears in 17 U.S.C. § 106
(2000):
[T]he owner of a copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to
authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
2002]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
are never really "reproduced" or "distributed," let alone "performed" or "displayed";
rather they are "accessed" remotely. The Lexis and Westlaw online databases of
legal materials are good examples. In terms, "accessing" Lexis or Westlaw does not
involve "reproducing" the Lexis or Westlaw databases, or "distributing" them, or
making derivative works from them, and so on. Although contracts can often
operate to accomplish the desired control over such access, contracts are of no help
against the unauthorized (and non-contracting) "hacker" who breaks into an online
service and thereby obtains access to the online materials. The DMCA's first and
second provisions that specifically prohibit "access" apply directly to that type of
conduct.63
None of these three new wrongs, incidentally, is defined to be a "copyright
infringement"; all are independent of infringement.' At least technically, then, the
various precedents, limitations, and interpretations of criminal copyright
infringement under the 1909 Act's Section 104 and the current Act's Section 506
may not be relevant to DMCA prosecutions.
6
In the last decade, Congress also has defined as a criminal wrong an activity that
is closely associated with copyright infringement, but does not actually constitute
copyright infringement: the recording of a live performance without the performer's
consent when done for commercial advantage or private gain. This activity is now
punishable by up to five years of imprisonment. Though not a copyright statute,
since copyright law only applies to creative works that are recorded with the
performer's consent, the provision closely tracks the wording of criminal copyright
infringement. The short definitional section confirms the statute's close association
with copyright law by stating that the terms used in the criminal statute are defined
as defined in the Copyright Act." For purposes of this Article, then, the provision
can be considered as yet another, recently added, type of criminal copyright
63 To be sure, courts might have stretched the definition of "reproduction" to encompass
"access," insomuch as viewing materials on one's own computer necessarily entails the
computer's having made a copy of the materials. Be that as it may, the language of the
DMCA in this regard now makes that sort of interpretative stretching unnecessary.
64 See United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (discussing the
district court's analysis of the DMCA as having been enacted under the Commerce Clause
power, not the "Intellectual Property" clause that authorizes Congress to create copyrights
and patents, and concluding that "Congress plainly has the power to enact the DMCA under
the Commerce Clause").
6 The DMCA itself provides that "[n]othing in this section shall affect rights, remedies,
limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title." 17
U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (2000).
" See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000). The statutory requirements of"commercial advantage"
and "private financial gain" mirror the language in the Copyright Act's Section 506(a)(1).
The definition section provides: "(1) the terms 'copy', 'fixed', 'musical work',
'phonorecord', 'reproduce', 'sound recordings', and 'transmit' mean those terms within the
meaning of title 17 [i.e., the Copyright Act]." 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(e)(l) (2000).
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infringement.
Greater reliance on criminal law to deter copyright (or copyright-like)
infringements means more than just the adoption of increased penalties and new
criminal violations. Whatever penalties and punishments are legislated must be
enforced, or they will amount to little. Part of the move to more criminal law
enforcement of copyright rights, not surprisingly, appears in the growth of new
programs in executive branch law enforcement agencies. Chief among these
agencies, the Department of Justice ("DoJ") has recognized the need for its own
education about, and greater participation in, curbing infringements. It has also
recognized Congress's elevation of some infringements from misdemeanor to felony
status, the latter almost automatically getting a higher priority within the agency
than the former.67 In 1991, the DoJ formed a "Computer Crime Unit" for computer
crimes broadly (i.e., not just copyright infringements). In 1996, the "unit" was
shifted to the organizationally elevated category of "section" and, significantly, was
renamed the "Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section." '68 Just three years
later, the agency announced the "Intellectual Property Rights Initiative," a joint
project among DoJ, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S. Customs
Service. The three organizations have described the initiative as intended to
decrease the amount of intellectual property crime, in part through the provision of
more staff training courses devoted to the detection of criminal copyright
infringements.6
9
In sum, the past ten to twenty years have shown that both the Executive and the
Legislative branches appear agreeable to increasing the level of detection and
prosecution of copyright infringement.7" Both seem to be "on board" with the idea
that intellectual property is valuable and vulnerable, and that undeterred
infringements - particularly in the digital age - are likely to prove destructive to
the country's production of intellectual output.
III. PUBLIC NOT ON BOARD
Substantial sectors of the public, however, seem not to be on board with this
greater attention to deterring copyright infringement. A voluble group of critics,
including law school professors, computer scientists, programmers, many members
of the Internet press, as well as students and Internet aficionados generally, argue
67 See Saunders, supra note 55, at 675 ("U.S. Attorneys confronted with a wide range of
possible prosecutions clearly prefer[] the prospect of almost any felony conviction to a
misdemeanor conviction for copyright infringement.").
68 Scott Charney & Kent Alexander, Computer Crime, 45 EMORY L.J. 931, 934 (1996).
69 Bernstein, supra note 42, at 338-39.
70 See also Charney & Alexander, supra note 68, at 941 ("The other major impact caused
by the shift to intangibles is that many of the existing theft, damage, and extortion laws
protect physical property. Thus, new crimes may need to be defined.") (emphasis added).
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vigorously against what they see as increasingly unjustified copyright restrictions.
Although not opposed to the basic principles of copyright, such as the need to
compensate authors, these critics rest their arguments largely on a sense that
copyright law has "gone too far." That law, they argue, either now encompasses or
soon will encompass - and prohibit - activities that neither the Founders nor
earlier Congresses ever intended to prohibit, nor that wise public policy would
prohibit.7 Further, this unwarranted extension of copyright owners' rights results
from the lobbying power of copyright-owning corporate interests; their political
influence continues the argument, only ineffectually offset by resource-poor and
dispersed interests like libraries, universities, and consumers, has too easily diverted
Congress's attention from any larger sense of public purpose.
Articles regularly fill the popular - not to say, the computer and Internet -
press with sharp criticism of businesses who would enforce copyright rights,
especially on the Internet. Users (or former users) of Napster-like online music
copying services may be the most vociferous. As noted by one article: "[T]he
extraordinary Napster phenomenon has been fueled only in part by the technology
that made it possible. It is also based in the antipathy many users express toward the
music industry .. .."" With regard to the Napster case and its plaintiff, the
Recording Industry Association of America (R.I.A.A.), the New York Times, for
example, reported law professor Lawrence Lessig's belief: "My view is that the
R.I.A.A. loses the battle and loses the war, because they become the bad guys....
With every song they tell Napster to remove, the political resistance to this extreme
view of copyright law will grow stronger." 3 Given that the music industry was
trying to prevent the unauthorized reproduction of millions of near-perfect copies
of its copyrighted recordings, a respected academic with impressive credentials
calling such an attempt "extreme" strikes one as bizarre, but portentous.
The examples multiply. The Washington Post reported one defense attorney on
the losing side of an action brought under the DMCA as saying: "I presume what
this [court decision] is going to do immediately is lead to a massive protest' ....
You can't put the genie back in the bottle."74 Respected legal authority Stuart
7 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 141 (1999).
Although not directly challenging intellectual property laws, Lessig worried that the
technological architecture ofthe Internet- the programming "code" that enables or prevents
different types of information to flow - may soon swallow up freedoms that users of
intellectual property once easily exercised. He urged us to restrict this development by
legislating the preservation and growth of an unrestricted "intellectual property commons,"
a kind of public domain. He concluded: "We can architect cyberspace to preserve [such] a
commons or not .... We should choose to architect it with a commons." Id.
72 Amy Harmon, The Napster Decision: The Reaction, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, at C i
(emphasis added).
13 Id. (quoting Lawrence Lessig).
" David Streitfeld, Judge Backs Hollywood In D VD Movie Case; Code Posting Called
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Biegel described the copyright issue as "perhaps the most contentious of all the
alleged Internet-related problems," observing that "[m]ost online users are copying
digital files allegedly belonging to others all the time, and the controversy.., has
continued unabated."75 Other articles quote civil libertarians and computer scientists
who raise strong First Amendment concerns over copyright and similar
restrictions," or argue that teachers and scholars will soon not be able to afford to
do their jobs."
In one astonishing illustration of copyright's contentiousness, a computer
programmer under indictment in one country, and a named defendant in a separate
U.S. case, was honored for his pioneering computer work by an Internet civil
liberties group.78 All three actions - criminal indictment, civil suit, and honorary
award - were for the same activity. He had devised and disclosed a method for
defeating the technology that prevents the copying of movies recorded on DVDs.
To say that these examples reflect a measure of hostility, even to increased civil
liability under copyright law, significantly understates matters. If critics' attention
turns more sharply to copyright infringement as the "new white-collar crime," with
Copyright Violation, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2000, at EO1.
" STUART BIEGEL, BEYOND OUR CONTROL? CONFRONTING THE LIMrrs OF OUR LEGAL
SYSTEM IN THE AGE OF CYBERSPACE 280-81 (2001).
76 See, e.g., David Glovin, DVD Copyright Fight: Movie Studios, U.S. vs Media,
Programmers, BLOOM BERG NEWS, May 1,2001 ("Groups representing journalists and civil
libertarians say [a judge's order restricting web linking to software that "hacks" the copy
protection on DVDs] ... violates the First Amendment because it's a restraint on speech.
Computer scientists, meanwhile, say computer code... deserves the same First Amendment
protections as political speech.").
" See Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyright as Cudgel, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 2,
2002, at 7:
[F]air use, while not quite dead, is dying. And everyone who reads, writes, sings,
does research, or teaches should be up in arms.... Back in the 20th century, if
someone had accused you of copyright infringement, you enjoyed that quaint
and now seemingly archaic guarantee of due process. Today, due process is a lot
harder to pursue . . . [T]he Digital Millennium Copyright Act [is] reckless,
poorly thought out, and with gravely censorious consequences[, and] course
packets that used to be easy to assemble and affordable to students are now a
hassle and a big expense. Professors are abandoning them in favor of
prefabricated published readers or less-convenient library reserves.
78 See Press Release, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Electronic Frontier Foundation
Honors Pioneer Award Winners (Apr. 11, 2002) available at
http://www.eff.org/awards/200204l1 eff.pioneer_pr.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2003). The
Electronic Frontier Foundation annually gives awards and recognition to those "who have
made significant and influential contributions to the development of computer-mediated
communications or to the empowerment of individuals in using computers and the Internet."
Id. In giving the award to the Norwegian programmer Jon Johansen, EFF executive Shari
Steele lauded him as a "shining example[] of the spirit and energy that make the Internet
great." Id.
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the invocation of all the investigative and prosecutorial resources that that term
implies, we will feel even more keenly the disturbing disconnect between copyright
owners who see the Internet as an unprecedented threat to intellectual property, and
copyright consumers who see copyright owners as an unprecedented threat to
liberty.79
We are witnessing, then, a growing split between the government and various
copyright-dependent industries, like music, computer software, and motion pictures,
on the one hand, and highly critical copyright consumers and Internet users on the
other. To better understand this split, we need to explore the way that today's most
troublesome copyright infringements differ from those in the past, and to focus more
sharply on the ambivalence in the public's view of copyrights as a kind of
"property."
First, if readers will accept for a moment this obviously overbroad
generalization: Copyright infringements have tended in the past to fall into two
different categories, the "good" and the "bad." We still have these two categories.
The "bad" infringers are those who deliberately enter the business of infringing for
profit - audio tape bootleggers selling from the trunk of a car, for instance. The
"good" infringers are those who, at worst, act inadvertently, and at best, act in a kind
of naive good faith that they are promoting the public good - the university
professor who assembles a course packet for students, for example. The defining
characteristics of these two opposites are that "bad" infringements are motivated by
financial gain and consequently are done on a significantly large scale to help
achieve that aim. "Good" infringements are the opposite; they are not undertaken
for immediate financial gain, nor are they undertaken on a large scale. Bad
infringements exhibit a congruence: harm to the victim, and gain to the perpetrator.
Today, though, we have begun to see a third category of infringer: individuals
who have no particular profit motive, but who use the Internet to cause, or to avail
themselves of, infringements multiplied on a huge scale. Napster and similar file
copying services are one example of this new wave of infringer, described by one
court as "heedlessly irresponsible, and at worst ... nihilistic, self-indulgent, and
lacking in any fundamental sense of values."8  These infringement activities
challenge our easy categorization of "good" and "bad" because they fall squarely in
the middle. The actors involved have no overt or immediate commercial motive,"'
7 Two commentators observed, for example, that tensions between copyright producers
and copyright consumers have always featured "incessant bickering," but that today "these
ongoing tensions have seemingly reached a boiling point." WAYNE CREWS & ADAM
THIERER, THE GREAT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEBATE TO COPY FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE xv (2002).
0 United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 545 (D. Mass. 1994).
8 The creator of the Napster software, Shawn Fanning, apparently did not have a
profitable business in mind when he wrote the Napster program. Other relatives joined in and
clearly were thinking of the file sharing system as'a major business opportunity. But to end
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but they do operate on a large scale. Congruence is absent: there is harm to the
copyright owner, but there is no obvious matching gain to the infringer.
Second, and more subtly, we need to have an appreciation for the different
instinctive responses that many people exhibit toward basic notions of "property"
and "theft" generally. A major principle justifying the punishment of copyright
infringement, and certainly criminal punishment, is that "you shouldn't take what
doesn't belong to you." The notion that things can "belong to you" is a property
notion. If, as I believe is true, the public views tangible property theft and
unauthorized copying as fundamentally different, then the difference may well have
something to do with the public's underlying sense of what "property" means.
Part IV will explore these two concepts - the distinctions between the good,
the bad, and the in-between infringer, and the instincts that the public brings to its
thinking about "property."
IV. WHY IS COPYRIGHT CONTROVERSIAL?
Categorizing infringers as "good" or "bad" obviously condenses what is in fact
a continuous spectrum of normatively arrayed behaviors. But as long as readers
remember that that is what we are doing, condensing the spectrum can help to
crystallize important distinctions.
When I discuss "bad" infringers, I mean those defendants who are by almost
anyone's standards "bad guys" - wrongdoers, shady characters, fly-by-night con
men, and so on. These are people who operate warehouses and factories where they
undertake mass reproduction of obviously copyrighted, high-value materials in a
systematic way. The resulting copies may carry muddily photocopied black and
white labels, or no labels, but in any case they are sold or intended to be sold on a
commercially significant scale. Motion pictures, audio CDs, computer software, and
the like are typically involved. Frequently, blank recording media like tapes or CDs
have been purchased in large bulk quantities; duplicating machinery appears on
floors and tables in dusty warehouses; and so on.82
users, no profit motive appeared, as all downloads were free.
82 See, e.g., Press Release, United States Dep't of Justice, Two Brooklyn Men Indicted
in Connection with Largest Seizure of Counterfeit DVDs in United States History (Jan. 11,
2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/qazaindict.htm (last visited
Jan. 20, 2003):
[T]he defendants operated a distribution center out ofa storefrunt on Myrtle
Avenue in Brooklyn. The operation, which law enforcement officials estimate
distributed thousands of counterfeit newly released CDs and DVDs weekly, was
a principal source of supply for a network of outdoor flea market vendors in the
metropolitan area. On December 13, 2001, agents of the United States Secret
Service executed search warrants at the factory and a nearby storage facility
where the defendants warehoused the counterfeit goods, effectively shutting
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Cases like these dot the reporter volumes, but seldom make the national news.
When they do surface, even the most ardent defenders of the most extreme claims
for fair use, first sale, free speech, and other copyright defenses, raise no objection
to the resulting civil judgments or criminal convictions. The rawness of the "bad
guys' profit motive, coupled with their often blatantly large-scale operations, seem
to leave no doubt about the rightness of the proceedings brought against them,
whether civil or criminal.
The second category of "good guy" cases is different. In these cases,
individuals with typically no direct commercial motivation reproduce copyrighted
works on a small scale, for their own use or the use of friends or students. The most
controversial thing about non-profit, small-scale infringements is whether we should
even call them "infringements" at all. Indeed, courts facing this sort of "good guy"
case may well decide that the "infringer's" actions amounted to a fair use, or at
worst, that they deserve no more than an injunction against repetition. No doubt
countless numbers of such small-scale activities take place every day, but from
which no litigation ever results. Perhaps an infringement that falls deep in the forest
makes no noise.
Part of the public's and the courts' vexation with copyright law today stems
from a new category of infringer, one that seems to fall halfway between the good
and the bad. Examples these days are legion: the teenagers who make a sport of
finding and publicizing ways to defeat copy-protection technologies;83 or the
computer scientists who believe that the research ethic requires them to publish their
findings of vulnerabilities in a commercial encryption technology; 4 or the college
students who accumulate a collection of MP3 music files for their own enjoyment."5
down their enterprise. Law enforcement's mid-December operation resulted in
the largest seizure of counterfeit DVDs in United States history, with over
30,000 counterfeit movies and an equal number of counterfeit musical
recordings with a total retail value of approximately $1 million.
In addition to mass-producing a wide variety of popular musical recordings
from rock to rap, including popular recording artists like Santana, Jennifer Lopez
and R. Kelly, the defendants distributed movies that were either newly released
or soon to be released on DVD, including the Godfather Trilogy, Cats and Dogs,
and the Grinch.
83 See Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (dealing with the
aftermath of teenager Jon Johansen's defeating DVD encryption); see also supra note 78.
Albeit not directly involving copyright law, a comparable episode of teenage "hackers"
causing a massive outage of telephone service is described in MICHELLE SLATALLA &
JOSHUA QurTNER, MASTERS OF DECEPTION (1995), in which the authors chronicle the
activity of the self-identified "Legion of Doom."
84 See, e.g., Glovin, supra note 76.
85 I believe it to be a commonly-accepted fact that college students still download MP3
music files, even after Napster was enjoined out ofbusiness. For support of this position, see
Lisa Guernsey, Very Big Pipes, N.Y. TUAES, Jan. 13, 2002, § 4A, at 24.
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Two hallmarks of this third category distinguish it from the other two: First,
like the activities of the "good guy" infringers, the activities of the new "gray area"
infringers are not for profit or personal financial gain. But second, like the activities
of the "bad guy" infringers, the activities of the "gray area" infringers involve a
large-scale distribution that poses potentially significant harm to copyright owners.
In most cases, we can point to the ubiquitous and near-instantaneous Internet as the
reason for this latter characteristic.
The activities of the first group, the unabashedly commercially motivated, fit
without controversy under the labels of "pirates" and "thieves." DoJ press releases,
for example, often characterize such defendants with such words. One typical press
release read this way:
"Star Wars Episode 2 opened in theaters only yesterday. But because of
software pirates .... it likely opened on the Internet weeks ago," said
U.S. Customs Commissioner Robert C. Bonner. "This is stealing, plain
and simple, and those engaged in the theft of intellectual property
deserve to be prosecuted and punished. The unprecedented penalty
issued today should serve as a wake-up call to other cyber thieves." 6
Members of Congress showed no hesitation in using similar terminology for this
same group:
Notwithstanding [the existing] penalties [for copyright infringement]
copyright piracy of intellectual property flourishes, assisted in large part
by today's world of advanced technologies. . . . In some countries,
software piracy rates are as high as 97% of all sales .... The effect of
this volume of theft is substantial: lost U.S. jobs, lost wages, lower tax
revenue, and higher prices for honest purchasers of copyrighted
software.8 7
And of course, the "No Electronic Theft Act,"" which lowered the threshold for
proving criminal copyright infringement, dealt with "theft" by its very terms.
With some notable exceptions, courts often apply similar characterizations of
wrongdoing to "bad guy" infringers, referring to their actions as "theft," "stealing"
or "piracy" and the like. 9 Private organizations like trade associations active in
86 Press Release, United States Dep't of Justice, Warez Leader Sentenced to 46 Months,
(May 17,2002), availableathttp://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/sankusSent.htm (last
visited Jan. 20, 2003) (emphases added).
87 H.R. REP. No. 106-216 (1999), cited in Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 1 I I F.
Supp. 2d 294, 335 n.230 (emphases added).
88 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
89 See, e.g., Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 442 (2d Cir. 2001)
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trying to stop copyright infringements also (predictably) make use of such
characterizations.
The private organizations differ from the government entities perhaps only in
their willingness to suggest that the same sort of terminology should apply to all
groups of infringers. The R.I.A.A., for example, tries to educate college students
into greater respect for copyrights, running a campaign of sorts and a web site for
this purpose, both under the name "SoundByting." The web site distinctly
associates all types of copyright infringement with "theft," although it falls just
short of saying that infringement is theft: "The RIAA's [SoundByting] Campaign
[has as its purpose] to raise awareness that reproducing and distributing music
illegally is akin to stealing, and such actions have serious ethical and legal
consequences."
But by and large, notwithstanding the R.I.A.A. and other trade associations, far
(emphases added):
The [trial] Court observed that DeCSS was harming the Plaintiffs, not only
because they were now exposed to the possibility ofpiracy and therefore were
obliged to develop costly new safeguards for DVDs, but also because, even if
there was only indirect evidence that DeCSS availability actually facilitated
DVD piracy, the threat of piracy was very real, particularly as Internet
transmission speeds continue to increase.
The trial court in the same case had asserted that:
[T]his decision will serve notice on others that "the strong right arm of equity"
may be brought to bear against them absent a change in their conduct and thus
contribute to a climate of appropriate respect for intellectual property rights in
an age in which the excitement of ready access to untold quantities of
information has blurred in some minds the fact that taking what is not yours and
not freely offered to you is stealing.
Id. (emphasis added). Other courts are not so sure. In the LaMacchia case, the court
concluded that "interference with copyright does not easily equate with theft, conversion or
fraud." United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535,538 (D. Mass. 1994). And further, that
court asserted that:
While one may colloquially like[n] infringement with some general notion of
wrongful appropriation, infringement plainly implicates a more complex set of
property interests than does run-of-the-mill theft, conversion, or fraud. As a
result, it fits but awkwardly with the language Congress chose - "stolen,
converted or taken by fraud" - to describe the sorts of goods whose interstate
shipment § 2314 makes criminal.
Id.
90 RIAA, SOUNDBYTING web page, at http://www.soundbyting.com (last visited Sept.
15, 2002). RIAA does state directly that unauthorized copying is a "rip-off," which one
supposes is a sufficiently ill-defined term to imply "theft" without requiring the explicit use
of the latter word. See RIAA, SOUNDBYTING web page, at http://www.soundbyting.com/
html/who weare/areindex.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2002) ("Because uploading and
downloading somebody else's music without their permission isn't just against the law. It's
a rip-off. Simple as that.")
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fewer people seem likely to characterize the "good infringers" as "thieves" or
"pirates," or their conduct as "stealing," than are likely to so characterize the first
group. With "good" infringements, the congruence of low or non-existent harm to
copyright owners, with no obvious profit motive by the infringer, produces a
situation that simply does not resemble what people think of as "theft."
The third group in the middle - those who engage in the wide distribution of
infringed works, but without a profit motive - obviously poses problems for how
we conceptualize matters in relation to those of the other groups. This third group's
activities, in short, do not lend themselves to easy classification, nor do I have a
ready alternative classification for them (other than "third group in the middle").
But I can offer one way to think about this group, and the inconsistency that it
exemplifies between "harm to victim, no gain to perpetrator." We can look at
infringing activity as a combination (or confusion) of"tort" and "property" aspects.
"Bad infringements" involve both tort-related wrongdoing and property-related
wrongdoing. The property rationale is easy to see: Copyrighted property that
"belongs" to someone else is being converted to the defendant's own use. Slightly
less obvious, though, is the fact that the circumstances of the infringement - the
general furtiveness, the perpetrator's awareness of the impropriety (we can easily
imagine shifty-eyed characters on the lookout for the cops) - all feel very "tort-
like" in the sense of being "wrongful," of being "bad conduct," and so on. When
both tort and property aspects combine, no wonder that the public widely agrees
with the use of serious deterrence of such offenses through imposition of significant,
even criminal, punishments.
The middle group loses this dual aspect. Without shady characters operating out
of car trunks and hidden warehouses, but rather with wholesome college kids and
"computer geniuses," we cannot easily see the activity as tort-like. It does not have
the shady feel of "wrongfulness," of something underground or underhanded.
Consequently, public acceptance of criminal punishments for this group depends
almost solely on acceptance of the activity as a property-based wrong. And that
leads us to an inquiry into how the public views "intellectual property," as compared
to the way it views tangible property, and how we might account for any differences
in these views.
Let us start by noting that the difference between "good" and "bad"
infringement seems easy to understand, as I have already suggested. Shady
characters looking for a quick buck do not resemble college kids and "computer
geniuses," let alone something like a church choir that makes a hundred photocopies
of a contemporary religious hymn. But on closer examination, the public's differing
views of these two groups are not so easily explained after all. For when it comes
to tangible property, most people associate the word "theft" with an enormous range
of conduct - from the executive who embezzles millions of dollars, to the kid down
the street who "swipes" somebody's baseball glove. Setting aside any tort
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implications for a moment, we might say that the essence of "theft" of tangible
property seems to be an "unauthorized taking" on almost any scale. Whereas with
intangible property, the essence seems closer to something like a "large-scale taking
for blatantly commercial purposes."
Legend has it that well-known copyright law professor Paul Goldstein of
Stanford once posed a question to his Stanford law students. Would they, he asked,
take a book from a bookstore if they were certain that they would not be caught?
Overwhelmingly, the students said that they would not. But would they, Goldstein
continued, make a copy of an electronic book if they were certain that they would
not be caught? A great many students, including those who had answered the first
question in the negative, admitted that they probably would make such a copy.
They supported this behavior by noting that copying an electronic book did not
seem to cause anyone any harm (it left the original copy untouched), whereas taking
a tangible book did seem to cause harm (it reduced the bookstore's inventory).
Why would law students or the public readily regard the small-scale taking of
tangible objects as "theft," but only reluctantly, if at all, regard the small-scale
taking of intellectual property in the same way? A fortiori, why would the public
manifest even "ambivalence" toward the middle category of massive, but not
obviously commercial, reproduction as seen with Napster?
The concept of copyright cannot be beyond understanding. The Stanford
students presumably were bright and well-educated, and in any event, they were
taking a copyright class at the time. And the wrong associated with large-scale
commercial reproduction - precisely what the public does tend to equate with
"theft" - is the wrong of copyright infringement. All that is necessary for the
students to perceive small-scale copying as equally wrongful is to multiply. one
unauthorized copy, multiplied by the number of other people and occasions on
which the same activity can be expected to take place, equals a large harm to the
copyright owner. But the public seems not eager to do the calculation. Why not?
I suggest that the answer has to do with our instincts about "property." By
"instincts," I mean a quasi-conscious, initial response to circumstances, a response
largely molded by daily experiences starting at birth, rehearsed and reemphasized
over the years. I contrast an "instinctive" response to one based on conscious
thought and logical reasoning, especially as the latter results from formal education
and deliberation. Granted, I am not a psychologist or sociologist; I offer the
definition just given only because it has proved useful to me, and I hope that it will
prove useful to readers trying to understand public perceptions of "property,"
"theft," and "copyright."
People start life as children; childhood experiences exhibit two inevitable
qualities. First, we all grow up with daily exposure to tangible objects and the rights
of ownership associated with them. Second, we all grow up dealing solely with
small-scale transactions, typically on a very personal, face-to-face basis. Copyright
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rules have almost nothing in common with either of these experiences, whereas
tangible property ownership rules have everything in common with them.
When quite young, nearly everyone has the experience of being told something
like this: "That's Susie's truck; you can't take it. That truck belongs to Susie."
How many of us, though, ever heard this: "That's Susie's copyright; you can't
exercise her rights without her permission. That copyright belongs to Susie." Not
many of us ever heard such statements, I suspect (nor could we or should we have).
In every day of our lives as children, though, references recur to tangible objects and
to the ownership of those objects. We acquire tangible objects; we covet those we
cannot acquire; we give objects as presents and receive objects; we watch intently
to ensure that desserts are equally divided among ourselves and our siblings. All
along the way we are learning that one can own, or not own, or own and give away,
or receive and own, or cut into pieces and distribute ownership of, or otherwise grab
and guard and give, tangible things. And we learn about taking care of tangible
things as well. Most of us were at least cautioned at one time or another - if not
scolded for failing to heed a caution - to be careful with some object: not to spill
or break or drop it. Doubtless some parents make more of this than others, but
assuredly it would be the rare parent who even once cautioned a child not to break,
damage, or devalue a copyright.
The association between "tangible objects" and "property" that forms in this
familiar way eventually becomes a near inseverable bond. The association is so
strong that even law students often feel perplexed when their Property law professor
claims that the term "property" does not mean a tangible object. Rather, it means
a set of rights, a bundle of sticks. The notion that property is not a thing, but just a
set of rights in a thing, is far from intuitive. One suspects that even those very law
students, at least those who do not end up dealing directly with property law issues,
quickly forget the concept that "rights" and "objects" are different.9" For them, and
certainly for most people who are never exposed to formal legal notions or
definitions, "property" means tangible objects; tangible objects are what one owns;
what one owns is one's property. The circle is complete.
But intangible property lacks this familiar and intuitive character. For evidence
of this point, readers might think of statements that they have read and that assume
that rights in tangible property differ fundamentally from rights in intangible
property. Statements that seem to make perfect sense to us in the context of the one
can seem utterly nonsensical in the context of the other, even though - and this is
a crucial point - the legal system is quite capable of treating the two property
interests identically.92 Here is one example from a New York Times article: "[T]he
" "One suspects it" because the author himself forgot all about it until years later, when
he began thinking about intellectual property as "property" and what "property" means in the
first place.
92 See Trotter Hardy, Not So Different: Tangible, Intangible, Digital, and Analog Works
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music industry has not come forward with their own version of Napster to allow
people to swap files on line, which is something they obviously want to do," stated
the developer of a file copying service called Gnutella, interviewed for the article.9 3
That statement sounds reasonable. Would it sound equally reasonable, though, to
say instead: "The fast-food industry has not come forward with their own system
for letting consumers get cheeseburgers for free, which is something they obviously
want to do." With the former statement about file swapping, one's instincts are
likely to bring about a favorable response: "If consumers really want to swap music
files, then why hasn't the music industry tried to satisfy the demand, instead of
resisting it?" With the second statement about cheeseburgers, one's instincts are
more likely to bring about the response that "just because people want to have their
cheeseburgers for free doesn't mean that the industry is obliged to provide them for
free." And yet the two situations are legally equivalent.
On that very point, I have shown elsewhere94 that the two contexts - intangible
creations and tangible ones - exhibit no inherent, and no logical, differences for
purposes of the legal regime of property ownership. I argue here that the reason for
the different responses to the two statements is "not ... logic [but] experience,"95
specifically, the experience of growing up in a tangible world that forms our
instincts about what is and is not "property."
In addition to this intimate familiarity with tangible property and its ownership,
and a concomitant lack of familiarity with intangible property or its ownership, we
grow up with a second and equally inevitable experience. We make decisions and
take actions of only the most limited reach. For example, we may decide to read and
not watch television, or vice versa. We may decide to spend our allowance money
or save it. We may remember or forget to undertake prescribed duties or chores.
But we do not decide that our entire neighborhood will watch television; we do not
decide whether all residents of our community must spend their allowance or save
it; we do not have an opportunity to remember or forget to turn on the electricity or
tum off the water supply for our whole town. To be sure, one of the hallmarks of
growing up is that one's decisions and actions gradually attain a broader reach. But
even as adults, most of us live under circumstances - jobs, families, churches,
schools, clubs, relationships, teams - in which our routine decisions affect perhaps
a few dozen other people, rarely more.
and Their Comparison for Copyright Purposes, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 211 (2001)
[hereinafter Hardy, Not So Different]; Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in
Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217.
9 Harmon, supra note 72 (quoting Gene Kan).
4 Hardy, Not So Different, supra note 92. And yes, I do discuss there the issue of
information as a "public good" that is infinitely shareable, as contrasted with tangible objects
that are consumed with use. But I nevertheless conclude that no inherent differences justify
different legal treatment of tangible and intangible properties.
" OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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I do not mean, incidentally, that decision-making of the former, limited type is
unimportant; "importance" has nothing to do with my point. My point is rather
about the number ofpeople and transactions that we personally affect. By saying
that most people usually make decisions of "limited scope," even as adults, I mean
only that they do not regularly experience making decisions with significant
consequences for large numbers of people, over a great many transactions, over long
periods of time - certainly not compared to, say, the decision of a state legislature
to raise or lower a tax, or to fund Program X but not Program Y; or the decision of
a company president to sell a division or to expand operations in China; let alone the
decision of Congress to require regulatory approval of new drugs or to declare war.
Most of us, in short, are not at the top of the organizational pyramid - else the
pyramid would not have the shape of a pyramid.
Now, what do all of these seemingly obvious and humdrum examples of
allowance money and childhood chores have to do with copyright and our views of
what is, and is not, "property?" They have a great deal to do with them. Rights in
"copyrighted property" are quite abstract. Congress even determined that the
definition of a "work of authorship" in the current Act, probably the most
fundamental definition in all of our copyright law, would be the definition of an
intangible abstraction - specifically not a tangible object.96  Of course, any
reasonably intelligent person capable of abstract thinking can learn the idea that a
"work of authorship" is an abstract creation, whereas a "copy" is the tangible
embodiment of such a creation.97 But that idea must be learned, which implies a
deliberate and conscious process, and one without prior familiarity. Such a process
can be expected to leave the idea perpetually at odds with one's instincts - the
concept of "owning" an "abstraction" remains strongly counterintuitive because we
do not have the occasion while growing up to shape our intuitions around such a
concept.98
96 The phrase "work of authorship" (or "original work of authorship") is not specifically
defined in the statute. The legislative history says that the phrase was deliberately left
undefined with the intention that courts continue to apply the general understanding of that
term as it has developed in the caselaw. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 (discussing Copyright
Act § 102).
" Although "work of authorship" is left undefined in the statute, the term "copies" is
defined: "'copies' are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by
any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device. The term 'copies' includes the material object, other than a phonorecord, in which
the work is first fixed." Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
98 Again, I stress the point that lots of people can and do learn about "works of
authorship" and their differences from tangible objects. I am not saying that these
fundamental propositions of copyright law are "hard to understand." I am saying that they
are hard to summon forth as a reflex action: hard to apply instinctively. "Learning about
rights in abstract works of authorship in adulthood," and "learning about rights in tangible
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In addition to our life experiences' conditioning us that the "ownership" of
"abstractions" is counter-intuitive, that same experience ensures a highly limited
opportunity to see that our decisions have widespread effects on the lives of others.
This second factor also helps to explain our responses to copyright rights. The small
scope of decision-making that most of us experience - again, I refer only to the
number of people and transactions that we affect by our decisions, not to the
importance of those decisions - makes it hard to see why copying copyrighted
works can be harmful.
Let's start this second analysis with a familiar example, albeit one not usually
associated with copyright law. During every national political campaign, various
organizations urge voters to vote. Many of these organizations make use of public
service announcements or paid commercial time on television. I suspect that all of
us have heard and seen a representative of such an organization beamed into our
living rooms, urgently pleading with us to get out and vote, specifically because
"YOUR VOTE COUNTS!"
Why are these organizations not sued for common law fraud? "Fraud" is
defined as the making of a false or misleading statement, with the intention that the
listener rely on the statement, where the listener does in fact rely on it to his or her
detriment.99 Let's step through the elements. Does your vote count? To "count"
in this context means to matter - to make a difference. The speaker on the
commercial is assuring you that your vote - your individual vote - makes a
difference. This is not the same thing as saying that "your vote will be counted."'"
The statement is that your vote "counts" - that it makes a difference.
But it doesn't. No national election has ever been decided by a single popular
vote; only one ever split the votes in the Electoral College evenly, the election of
1800 - and that outcome prompted the adoption of a Constitutional amendment to
prevent it from happening again.' 0' I doubt that any state or many local elections
have been decided by a single vote either, short of perhaps local elections in very
small towns.0 2 Certainly no national election has been decided by one individual's
property," are quite different. The latter learning can rest on top of a sturdy foundation of
lifelong experience with tangible objects and the ownership of such objects. The former
learning has no such framework on which to rest.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 525 (1977).
"0 After the scandal of uncounted and miscounted votes in the 2000 presidential election,
perhaps even an assertion that your vote "will be counted" would constitute fraud.
101 WILLIAM C. KIMBERLING, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE (n.d.), available at
http://www.fec.gov/pdf/eleccoll.pdf (last visited September 21, 2002). The document lists
author Kimberling as Deputy Director of the FEC Office of Election Administration, but
emphasizes that "The views expressed here are solely those of the author and are not
necessarily shared by the Federal Election Commission or any division thereof."
102 I know first-hand of one election decided by four votes out of about 1400 ballots cast
in my own town of Williamsburg, Virginia. Perhaps even some past elections have been
decided by a single vote. But 1400 votes is not the scale on which national elections are
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vote. Even the exceedingly close Presidential election of 2000 - no matter whose
votes you add in or whose hanging chads you exclude - did not exhibit a difference
in the popular vote of "one." The entirety of our election history, in other words, not
to mention probability and statistics, argues that one individual citizen's vote, in a
national election, will not make a difference. Consequently, accuracy and
truthfulness demand that the get-out-the-vote commercials conclude with this line:
"REMEMBER: YOUR VOTE DOESN'T COUNT!" - not precisely its opposite.
We can move through the remaining elements of fraud quickly. The sponsoring
organization of the commercial appears to intend that listeners will rely on the false
statement about their votes counting by going out to vote when they might not have
done so otherwise. Many people surely will do so; or at least, we should be able to
find one test-case plaintiff who did so. Finally, the act of voting is a detriment of
sorts, inasmuch as it requires time and effort, and perhaps gasoline, wear-and-tear,
etc. At conventional reimbursement rates for automobile travel, which hover around
$0.30 per mile, some voters will surely have driven a few miles in reliance on the
belief that their vote will count. There we have it: a false or misleading statement
made to induce reliance, where that very reliance is in fact induced, to the relying
party's detriment - a perfectly garden-variety case of fraud.
The voting example is, of course, facetious. For one thing, maybe citizens do
not believe that their vote counts, commercials notwithstanding, but they are
committed to voting as a "good thing to do" anyway. But the harder question is this:
If "your vote really doesn't count," why do the organizations who sponsor these
commercials do so? The answer must be that they are not speaking to individuals
as such. They are speaking to thousands or hundreds of thousands of individuals -
to large groups. They do not seriously think - they cannot seriously think - that
one single voter will make a difference. They hope rather that by saying "your vote
counts," they will persuade a substantial number of otherwise reluctant voters to
vote, thereby increasing the overall voter turnout by some measurable percentage.
In short, they do not literally believe that "your vote" in the singular will make a
difference; they believe that saying so in a commercial shown to hundreds of
thousands ofpeople will make a difference. They are analyzing things from a much
larger scale and perspective than is experienced by each individual television
viewer.
Suppose that, instead of seeing a get-out-the-vote commercial on television, we
were to see a commercial from a copyright owner. The owner might say "Don't
Copy That Floppy," as a now obviously dated television spot once did some years
ago. Or perhaps the owner would say "YOUR COPYING COUNTS!" (in a
negative way, of course). These copyright messages are as fraudulent as the voting
ones. As addressed to any one individual, the message is simply not true: If one
person, on one occasion, copies one copyrighted work without authorization, the
decided.
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copyright owner is not harmed. Harm to the owner usually comes only from
widespread, frequent copying - from the aggregate effect of a great many small
decisions and actions by many people over periods of time. No one decision or
single action does any significant damage.
Appreciating the "aggregate effect" of one's actions cumulated with others' does
not, however, come naturally - large-scale outcomes, the results of the "law of
large numbers," are very much not instinctive. Remember that the great bulk of
experiences for most people, whether as children or adults, involves decisions and
actions that directly affect a very limited number of other people. None of us grows
up having to face the consequences of decisions that alter the lives, incomes,
relationships, or careers of even hundreds of other people, let alone hundreds of
thousands or millions. Few enough of us ever have to face those consequences at
any age, inasmuch as most of us - except perhaps those from Lake Woebegone -
cannot by definition all be at the "top of the pyramid," where seeing large-scale
results from one's decisions is much more likely.
Let's use these insights to revisit the story of the law students who admitted that
they would "steal" (i.e., copy) an electronic book, even though they would not steal
a tangible, paper copy of the same book. The first question we might ask is not the
one that copyright proponents are wont to ask, namely, why don't students (or
hackers or teenagers or whoever it is) respect the copyright to electronic books?
Instead, let's ask the reverse: Why would the students not steal a physical, paper
copy of a book? After all, one copy, of one book, taken from one store, one time,
would almost certainly do only negligible harm to the bookstore owner and to the
copyright owner as well - not much more harm, if at all, than would be done to an
electronic bookstore or electronic book author operating on the same scale of
operation (producing and selling comparable numbers of electronic books).
And yet, the students said they distinguished the two situations. I suspect, in
fact, that many other people would say the same thing and that far, far more people
would resist the theft of tangible objects than would do so in the case of intangible
"objects" like electronic books. Why is that?
Here is where I think the discussion of our "instincts" in regard to tangible
objects comes to the fore and helps to explain matters. If I am right that our instincts
are formed in, and strongly reflect, the context of small-scale transactions and
effects - and correspondingly that appreciating large-scale effects is counter-
intuitive for most of us - then Goldstein's bookstore example makes good sense.
To the individual, a single copy of a single paper book is significant; obtaining the
book (whether by paying or by stealing) is a significant transaction, albeit that it is
only one transaction. A book that one can hold and touch is "personal"; although
we would not mean it literally, we could say that a book is something one deals with
on a "face-to-face" basis. Quite naturally, to the individual, that single copy of a
single book, obtained in a single transaction, therefore has value and importance.
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As the voting commercials try to convince us, the student in the bookstore is already
predisposed to be convinced that that one book and its possible theft "count." The
book and its theft seem to matter, and that largely explains why the students would
not take a physical book without payment.
To the bookstore owner, however, the picture is different, at least if we confine
ourselves to large bookstores like Barnes & Noble or Borders. A single copy of a
single book, obtained by a single customer on a single occasion from a single store
- even without payment - is utterly insignificant. In the scheme of things, in the
context of hundreds of thousands of books, customers, stores, and transactions, one
copy of one book is likely to be worth less to the company than the cost of a couple
of bar-code scanning errors or an employee who takes fifteen minutes too long for
lunch.
What about the electronic book? Isn't the same thing true, namely, that one
copy of one electronic book, taken without authorization on one occasion, means
essentially nothing to a large-scale electronic book seller? Yes, it is true. The harm
only comes - just as it does with the paper book seller like Barnes & Noble -
from individual incidents like this one incident being repeated countless times. The
individual students (and I use "students" here only as an example of what I think
most people would do in the same circumstances) do not easily feel the aggregate,
large-scale effects of actions like their own being repeated thousands of times -
with either the electronic or the paper book. But the difference is this: With paper
book copies, all of our human instincts about, and familiarity with, small scale
transactions, and face-to-face settings, and "property" as something you can touch,
come to the fore to impress upon us that taking this one book "counts." Abstract
rights of distant copyright owners, only conceptually embodied in invisible
electrons, by contrast, necessarily carry much less weight. We cannot see them, or
touch them - neither the "rights" nor the "electrons." No wonder that the "harm"
from copying an electronic book, a harm that flows solely from large-scale effects
and aggregations and repetitions, remains equally "untouchable" - and apparently
unimportant.
CONCLUSION
Criminal penalties do not attach to "white-collar crime" as such; rather, the term
covers an array of different types of particular offenses, such as securities fraud or
embezzlement. Historically, few - if any - commentators or members of the law
enforcement community have considered criminal copyright infringement to be one
of those types. One reason infringement may not have been so considered in the
past is essentially definitional. Infringement does not correlate well with some of
the characteristics most-often identified with white-collar crime, such as the high
social status of the defendant (so identified at least in an earlier day), the ample
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corporate resources available to the defendant, or the defendant's reliance on fraud
or deceit. On the other hand, infringement may correlate better with other white-
collar characteristics, such as the use of special skills or professional training, as
when an employee of a software company knows how to "hack" around a software
encryption scheme intended to prevent copying.
More to the point, several factors suggest that criminal prosecution of copyright
infringement will increase in the near future, an increase that may result in a greater
tendency for law enforcement personnel to include infringement as another of many
other long-identified "white-collar crimes." First, the number and severity of
criminal violations defined in the statutes, either for copyright infringement or for
closely related activities, have increased in the last few decades. The earliest and
quite narrow criminal prohibition appeared in the Copyright Act in 1897, but today
about halfa dozen provisions - several added quite recently - now greatly expand
both the original range of activities subject to prosecution and also the sanctions
potentially applicable to violators. Law enforcement agencies also are paying much
closer attention to intellectual property related crimes. The DoJ in particular has
begun emphasizing the need to take such crimes more seriously, having in recent
years announced policies of engaging in more vigorous prosecution of these
offenses.
Second, some wrongs by their very nature are easier to detect than others.
Crimes that require the face-to-face application of force, for example, will more
likely result in witnesses, police reports, medical records, and other evidence than
will crimes that are accomplished by "cooking the company books" behind closed
doors. Copyright infringement, at least infringement that does not involve large-
scale distribution of the resulting copies, has always tended to be more like the
latter. Today, though, the prevalence of digital works of authorship and their easy
replication on the Internet can make even large-scale distribution of unauthorized
copies difficult to tie back to an identifiable infringer. When wrongful activities
have a very low likelihood of detection, one way the legal system can respond is by
substantially increasing the penalties for the activity. The utility of this approach
can be demonstrated with a brief analysis based on probability theory. This analysis
predicates that an uncertain punishment is like a certain punishment that has been
reduced or "discounted" by the probability that the punishment will, in fact, be
imposed. By invoking this "discounting" to produce a value for an "expected
punishment," we can easily see the social attractiveness of more stringent penalties
for copyright infringement, such as more frequent reliance on high-penalty criminal
conviction. To the extent that computers and the Internet are making copyright
infringements both more numerous and more difficult to detect than before, we will
likely see a continued increase in the number and application of such criminal
copyright provisions.
Unfortunately, though, the "social attractiveness" of greater criminalization may
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only be apparent to legislators, law enforcement agencies, and those industries that
depend on owning and protecting copyrights. Many others in the public generally
will not see the issue the same way and will not expect or demand - perhaps will
not even tolerate - increasing criminalization. Two factors help to explain this
public reaction to stronger enforcement of copyright protections - a reaction that
is, at best, one of ambivalence, and at worst, one of outright hostility.
First, copyright law creates a kind of property - intellectual property. The
legal system could easily treat both tangible and intellectual property interests in
near identical ways, and to a great extent does so already. Nearly all of us, though,
grow up from childhood with a heavy and inevitable exposure to the concept of
tangible property, but an inevitably light exposure to concepts of intangible property
like copyrights. We are thus predisposed to find the rules of tangible property
ownership to be appropriate and sensible, but not equivalently predisposed to find
those of intangible property ownership the same.
Second, even as adults, few of us routinely experience making decisions that
affect large numbers of people or transactions, or that continue to operate over long
periods of time. We are far more likely to experience short-term consequences in
face-to-face settings. We are thus predisposed to give greater weight and
significance to small-scale experiences - those that involve precisely such short-
term consequences and face-to-face settings. We are correspondingly less likely to
appreciate large-scale effects that result only from the aggregation of our own, and
many strangers', actions over periods of time. Copyright infringements often
exhibit the latter characteristic, namely, that "harm" to the copyright owner only
arises from the aggregate effect of many individually small and harmless
infringements. We should not be surprised to find, therefore, that public attitudes
toward copyright infringement as a kind of theft or stealing differ sharply from the
same attitudes toward tangible property theft or stealing.
In sum, the push by Congress and copyright-dependent industries toward the
increasing criminalization of infringement makes sense. Computerized, digital
works, along with the Internet, combine to facilitate both extremely large-scale
reproduction and distribution, while preserving relative anonymity for the
responsible infringer. In such circumstances of great potential harm and equally
great difficulty of detection and identification of those responsible, sharply increased
penalties become one of the legal system's few effective responses.
But increasing the criminalization of infringement also makes no sense. In
circumstances where tangible property rights are intimately familiar, and intangible
property rights exotic - where immediate harm to people or objects at hand counts
for much, but harm from a large-scale aggregation of individually small actions
counts for very little - the public will not easily understand why today's new
infringers are now to be considered "white-collar criminals."
2002]
